The law on searches and seizures (4-part series)

By Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes III

 

(This is the beginning of the second part of the 4-part series of the article entitled: The law on searches and seizures).

 

The SECOND CASE involves another checkpoint which was set-up but this time, instead of mere cursory or visual searches, the police officers stepped into or boarded the public buses and jeepneys as well as private vehicles. Here, the SC ruled that while the act of entering the public jeepneys and buses is allowed, the same should not be allowed when the motor vehicle involved is privately-owned, or even a public utility but is chartered in such a way that only a particular person or his group are allowed to board therein. This is because when privately-rented the public utility vehicle attains a certain zone of privacy such that the right to privacy of the citizen should be respected. Here is how the SC amplified its ruling, thus:

 

“Reasonable Searches v. Warrantless Searches; Buses & Jeepneys v. Private Vehicles and Taxis

A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an “unreasonable search,” but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.

x x x

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category. Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle”.(Marcelo G. Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018).

 

In the THIRD CASE that is featured in this article, the eye in the storm of the controversy is the act of the police officers of stopping a public bus on the basis of a “confidential tip” which contained very vague and general descriptions of the suspect although they already had a specific person in mind. The non-specific description envisaged by the anonymous tip, could match any innocent person on board and yet the police had already singled-out a specific person whom they wanted to arrest. Since the police acted on such obscure tip and they stopped the public bus on the highway and arrested a person who was simply sitting on board the bus, the SC ruled that the police officers committed a breach of the right of the person arrested against unreasonable searches and seizures. Said the SC: “The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, “law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.”

 

In People v. Cogaed (2014), the court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless search, “it is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.” The court explained that “the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act,” and not merely rely on the information passed on to him or her.

 

The court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People, a bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a Military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case, the authorities merely conducted a “visual and minimally intrusive inspection” of the accused’s bag- by simply lifting the bag that noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by the accused –appellant Sapla.

 

The Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in transit:

 

(1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive;

 

(2) the search must not be discriminatory;

 

(3) as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and

 

(4) the courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

 

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

 

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search- which include both long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence- should be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.

 

Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the authorities are given the unbridled license to undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the absence of any overt circumstance that engenders a reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.

 

Neither can the court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla as a valid consented search. In People v. Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following are present:

 

1. It must appear that right exist;

 

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and

 

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

 

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that “the fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.”

 

In the instance case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court that the accused-appellant Sapla’s apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to coercive environment, considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a checkpoint.

 

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

 

Known as the exclusionary rule, “evidence obtained and confiscated of such unreasonable searches and seizures is deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other, words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.”

 

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, the prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla. Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.”

(People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)

 

(This is the end of part II. Watch out for parts III-IV in subsequent issues of this newspaper. Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III is the senior partner of ET Reyes III & Associates- a law firm based in Iloilo City. He is a litigation attorney, a law professor and a law book author. His website is etriiilaw.com).