Game theory and the commuter’s burden

By Ray Adrian C. Macalalag

Are you familiar with the prisoner’s dilemma? It is a game theory thought experiment that explains why even the most rational individuals might not cooperate, even if doing so serves their best interests. It starts with two suspects being arrested. If they both remain silent (cooperate), they receive, say, two years in prison. If one of them testifies (defects) and the other stays silent, the defector goes free while the other receives a much longer sentence, say 10 years. If both of them testify, they get a moderate sentence, say five years.

As a public transport patron, I remain trapped in the rabbit hole, analyzing what went wrong in the long run of the public transportation system, including jeepneys, taxis, and tricycles, and how tensions in the Middle East deepened the system’s wounds. I have heard personal accounts from drivers grateful to their operators for reducing their boundaries to ease the impact of rising fuel prices. I also see some parties struggling while relying on the understanding and generosity of passengers who pay extra pesos.

This daily struggle on our roads is not merely a consequence of volatile oil markets. It is a structural prisoner’s dilemma. We have multiple players, including drivers, operators, local governments, and national regulators, each choosing self-preservation over collective efficiency, resulting in a system where everyone loses.

For decades, the boundary system has dictated the livelihood of transport workers. Under this setup, drivers pay a fixed daily rent to the operator and keep the remaining fare. While this incentivizes hustle, it forces hypercompetition and pushes all market risks onto the driver. Drivers must accept a hard truth: The boundary system is an inherently high-risk structure. If incomes were fixed and salaried, the immediate impact of global fuel spikes would not devastate their daily survival. Clinging to the boundary system is a defection that leaves them vulnerable, whereas embracing formalized income is the cooperative move toward stability.

Operators must also remember that while they are running a business, the ultimate enabler of their profit is the government’s grant of a Certificate of Public Convenience. Their privilege to operate is fundamentally a mandate for public service. When operators prioritize rigid boundary quotas over the welfare of their fleet and passengers, they defect against the public interest. True cooperation requires operators to absorb market shocks collectively and prioritize service reliability over guaranteed daily cuts.

Furthermore, local government units currently face structural limitations, as they lack the proper venue and capability to have a direct hand in fare determination. This situation often leaves the heavy burden of fare stabilization entirely to the national government or the riding public. While some local governments attempt to assist through targeted subsidies, this current practice frequently leads to disputes and frustration among public transportation drivers who do not receive the aid. To foster better cooperation, local governments could explore providing more comprehensive and inclusive localized incentives. This proactive approach would help stabilize transport prices within their jurisdictions, effectively cushioning both the driver and the commuter before passengers are forced to dig deeper into their pockets to bridge the gap.

Finally, the regulators themselves must break out of their bureaucratic inertia. The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board needs to accept that passenger demand is dynamic and shifts drastically by the hour. The traditional, rigid fleet-per-route franchise system is obsolete, creating severe oversupply in some areas and critical shortages in others. By allowing flexible, data-driven route rationalization, vehicles could adapt to shifting demand throughout the day. This would balance the income flow across the entire transport sector rather than oversaturating a single high-demand corridor.

Looking back at the past challenges encountered by the transport sector, the burden has disproportionately fallen on commuters. For years, the only long-standing solution felt by passengers has been the continued rise in fares, yet there remains no significant improvement or realization of the much-anticipated jeepney modernization program. A glaring example of this occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. Fares were increased to compensate for the strict limits on passenger capacity. However, when health restrictions were lifted and passenger capacity returned to prepandemic levels, these elevated fares almost never normalized.

This historical pattern proves that the public transportation crisis will not be solved by passengers simply paying more or drivers working longer hours. Until drivers accept salaried stability, operators honor their public service mandate, local governments are empowered to provide more inclusive direct support, and regulators devolve some of their decision-making power and adopt dynamic routing, the nation’s commuters will continue to serve the longest sentence.