The impeachment trial: standard of conduct, standard of evidence

By Dean Jose Mari B.F.U. Tirol

It is reasonable to expect that the Vice President, like all other persons in government service, will act a certain way. And it is also reasonable to expect that she is aware of Republic Act 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” which emphasizes the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public service: “public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.”

These standards dovetail with Section 1, Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

The four articles of impeachment filed against the Vice President, which are the subject of the present impeachment trial, charge her with misuse of confidential funds, unexplained wealth, bribery, and grave threats, essentially alleging that she failed to observe the high standard of ethics required of her. While the four predicate acts are criminal in nature, the impeachment trial is not intended to determine her criminal liability, but to answer the question of whether or not she is fit to remain in office.

It is a basic principle of law that those who allege – those who file a case – have the burden to prove their case. In trial courts and administrative agencies, complainants are guided by a specific standard or quantum of evidence that depend on the nature of the case: substantial evidence for administrative cases, preponderance of evidence for civil cases, clear and convincing evidence in certain civil cases, for example those involving fraud and forgery, and nullity of marriage, and proof beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases. Such standards are familiar to trial judges as well as labor arbiters and other officials who hear and decide administrative cases, and litigators appearing before them, because of their training and experience.

The impeachment trial is nether civil, criminal, nor administrative; is a class of its own. The Constitution and the rules of the Senate as an impeachment court do not require a specific standard or quantum of proof or evidence by which Senator-Judges can evaluate the evidence of the parties for the purpose of determining whether the respondent acted in accordance with the high standards of public service.

This is to be expected. Not all Senator-Judges have a legal background, and the impeachment trial, despite its legal basis and legal consequences, is also a political exercise. If two-thirds of the Senator-Judges decide to convict her because she failed to act in accordance with the standards expected of her she will be removed from office and disqualified from holding any other public office. But her removal will not automatically make her civilly or criminally liable for the predicate acts. Under the Constitution, the same would require the filing of the appropriate civil or criminal case against her, and the determination of her guilt in accordance with the appropriate standard or quantum.

In other words, while the four articles of impeachment charge her with the four predicate acts of misuse of confidential funds, unexplained wealth, bribery, and grave threats, the impeachment trial is not intended to determine whether she committed the said predicate acts. Its scope is narrow: to answer the question of whether or not she is fit to remain in office.

The answer to that question does not require that she first be found guilty of the predicate acts. For while there is no specific standard of proof in impeachment cases, and Senator-Judges will essentially vote in accordance with the dictates of their conscience, they do not have unfettered discretion (see “Two-thirds,” 7/14/2026). And it would be contrary to the demands of accountability if Senator-Judges require that the respondent be first convicted of violating the predicate acts before she can be convicted in the impeachment trial.

This is neither unusual nor unfair, and this is not illogical or illegal.

Impeachment is in a sense like the crime of fencing; prior conviction for theft or robbery is not necessary to prosecute fencing (Lim v. People [2016]). In addition, impeachment is also like the anti-money laundering law which criminalizes and punishes money laundering but not the predicate act/s where the laundered funds came from, which are the subject of separate proceedings. These are distinct from the offense of money laundering, such that the two offenses may be prosecuted in separate criminal actions (Lingad v. Republic [2022]). An accused can be charged with and convicted of money laundering even though they have not been charged with or found guilty of the predicate act, as this is not an element of the crime of money laundering. In like manner, a finding of guilt for a predicate act is not an essential element of civil forfeiture (Republic v. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services [2008]).

Only the trial courts have the jurisdiction to determine the possible criminal or civil liability of the Vice-President for the predicate acts that the articles of impeachment are based on. The Senator-Judges do not have the authority to do so,  thus it would be highly improper for them to demand or expect proof concerning the same.

Her possible criminal or civil liability are essentially immaterial to the issue before them: to determine whether her acts are in accordance with the high standards of public service, and accountability, expected of her. As explained by Senator Alan Peter Cayetano: “The Impeachment Court does not simply pass judgment … The Court’s action, being far reaching and precedent-setting, is actually rebuilding a new paradigm of transparency and accountability in public office.” (Transcript of Record at 8, In Re: Impeachment Trial of Hon. Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Senate Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 [May 29, 2012]).