The circus is in town

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

 

The replacement of Taguig City Rep. Alan Peter Cayetano by Marinduque Rep. Lord Allan Velasco as Speaker of the House of Representatives signals the arrival of the political circus in town. If I may say, dear Reader, that this unofficially starts the opening of the election season in the country for the Presidential elections in May 2022.

In Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, the election season for the local elections started with billboards bearing the message “CADIZ FOREVER” followed by “_________ NEVER”, placed in strategic locations in Cadiz City on the early part of Nov. 2002. This was the case reported in G.R. No. 172203, which was promulgated on February 14, 2011, titled DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., Respondents. The decision was penned by Justice Mariano Del Castillo.

On Nov. 15, 2002, Cadiz City Mayor Salvador “Bading” Escalante was informed that the blank space has been filled up. It now stated: “CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER”. “Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a ‘tuta’ of Sagay,’ Mayor Escalante sued  the author of the billboards for libel, Dionisio Lopez. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.” Sagay City is adjacent to Cadiz City.

Upon his arraignment on May 8, 2003, accused Lopez, who had admitted placing the controversial billboards, entered a plea of “not guilty.” “During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname ‘Bading’ and that the petitioner calls the private complainant ‘Bading.’ Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due course.”

On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting accused Lopez, who appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, affirmed it with a minor modification. The CA reduced only the amount of moral damages. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Lopez petitioned the Supreme Court, assailing the CA’s decision.

The Supreme Court said that “(s)ummed up, the focal issues tendered in the present petition boil down to the following: 1) whether the printed phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.”

The Supreme Court defined libel as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.”

Then, the Supreme Court stated that there is a need to establish that that the words complained of are defamatory before the elements of libel can be asserted. Thus:

“Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.”

When are words cosidered defamatory? The Supreme Court said that “(a)n allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine ‘whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.’ Moreover, ‘[a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.’”

The Supreme Court then applied these established standards,

“(W) cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s finding that the phrase ‘CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER’ tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s integrity. Obviously, the controversial word ‘NEVER’ used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondent’s performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.

The Supreme Court explained that:

“[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation, words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself, x x x.”

In closing, the Supreme Court explained that:

“In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt.’ In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” imputes derogatory remarks on private respondent’s character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot.”

The Supreme Court then granted the petition and acquitted Dionisio Lopez.

Please note, my dear Reader, that the Supreme Court did not anymore take up the second focal point, which is “2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.” This is so because the resolution of this case hinges only on the first focal point – “1) whether the printed phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” is libelous.”

I wish to share with you, my dear Reader, the opening paragraph of the decision:

“’Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights.  Free expression however, ‘is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.’(Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 75 (1948). Libel  stands as an exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.”