‘She has suffered enough’

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico 

The case of LIGAYA S. NOVICIO vs. ALMA AGGABAO (G. R. 141332; Dec. 11, 2003) is a libel case decided by the Third Division of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Renato Corona, when he was still an Associate Justice, wrote the decision.

The case started in 1995 when Novicio, who is a  “stockholder and treasurer of Philippine International Life Insurance Company (Philinterlife), sent a letter to Philinterlife’s depository banks, namely, Far East Bank and Trust Company, China Banking Corporation and First Bank, informing these banks that several stockholders of Philinterlife, including respondent Alma Aggabao, had been restrained by the Court of Appeals’ Twelfth Division, in a separate action for annulment of sale of the company’s shares, from exercising their rights as shareholders of Philinterlife.” The letter is reproduced in full: 

“Please be informed that the Court of Appeals (12th Division) has issued a Resolution dated April 10, 1995 restraining Jose C. Lee, Carlos Lee, Carmencita V. Tan, Angel Ong, Benjamin C. Lee, Alma Aggabao and Ma. Paz C. Lee from, among others, exercising their rights and privileges (sic) as shareholders of Philippine International Life Insurance Company until further orders from said Court. A copy of such Resolution is hereto attached for your immediate reference.

In pursuance of the subject Resolution, the remaining members of the Board of Directors of Philinterlife who were duly constituted prior to the controversy, had decided to change the bank signatories of its corporate account in your bank. The new signatories are any two of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Ms. Ligaya Novicio; (b) Mr. Jose Gatchalian; and/or Mr. Jose Ortañez. Enclosed please find the requisite Secretary’s Certificate attesting to such change.

You are therefore, put on notice not to deal with the afore-mentioned persons who were restrained by the Court of Appeals from exercising their rights as Shareholders of Philinterlife. The company shall not honor any transaction that may be entered into by said persons for and its behalf.”

When she learned about the letter, Aggabao “filed a complaint-affidavit in the Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City charging petitioner with libel. x x x. The city prosecutor, however, dismissed respondent’s complaint.” On petition for review,  the Department of Justice granted the petition and ordered the filing of informations on 3 counts of libel.

Before arraignment, “Novicio moved to quash the informations alleging that the facts charged therein did not constitute libel.” The trial court denied the motion. Her motion for reconsideration was also denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. However, the CA dimissed her petition. After her motion for reonsideration was denied by the CA, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The sole issue to be decided “is whether or not the letter written by petitioner Novicio was libelous.”

The Supreme Court enumerated the elements of the crime of libel:

“For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity and (d) the victim must be identifiable.”

The Court then held that “except for the element of identification, the informations filed against petitioner failed to establish the three other elements of libel.”

It then examined the first eIement and said that “(i)n determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.”

It held that “(i)n this case, the words used by petitioner in her letter did not cast aspersion on respondent’s character, integrity and reputation. They were intended merely to notify the banks concerned of the change of bank signatories of Philinterlife as a consequence of the resolution of the Court of Appeals. No veiled and malicious suggestion or innuendo could be inferred from the fact that respondent, who used to be an authorized signatory of the company, was being replaced as such. The letter did not in any way convey the idea that respondent was guilty of any offense which besmirched her integrity and reputation. On the contrary, the language used by petitioner was plain, simple, direct and factual. The words could not be interpreted to mean other than what they intend to say — that respondent had ceased to be a bank signatory and all transactions entered into by her were no longer going to be honored by Philinterlife.”

Subsequently, it examined the existence of the second element. It said that  “the informations failed to allege the existence of malice. There is malice when the author is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks not in response to a duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.”

Then, it held that “(i)n this case, however, petitioner’s letter was written to inform the banks in which Philinterlife maintained its corporate accounts of the court’s resolution and the corresponding change of bank signatories. It is, thus, a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code.”chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Court noted that the “letter was an official act done in good faith and constituted an honest narration of the events that transpired within the company. It emanated from a moral and legal obligation which petitioner certainly owed Philinterlife in the performance of her duties. Thus, she cannot be said to have been prompted by malice or by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on respondent’s reputation.”

Finally, the Court examined the presence of the third element. It held that “the element of publication was not present in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner sent the letter only to the branch managers of the banks concerned. She did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons, nor was the letter published and circulated to the public. Doubtlessly, there was no publicity and the matter fell within the ambit of Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code.”  

The Supreme Court then ordered the dismissal of the case. Thus:

“Ligaya Novicio is certainly entitled to the dismissal of the case against her. She has suffered enough. There is no point in proceeding with a defective information that can never be the basis of a valid conviction. In this case, the facts alleged in the informations did not constitute libel.”