Sara Duterte Impeachment: The Case Has Strengthened; the Vote Count Has Not

By Francis Allan L. Angelo and Joseph Ledesma Ladrido

After 21 completed trial days, our outlook on the impeachment of Vice President Sara Duterte has moved clearly on the merits but only slightly on the probability of actual conviction. The evidence now supports a stronger case for removal than it did when the trial opened, while the Senate arithmetic remains much less favorable to conviction.

When we began tracking the case after the first three trial days, we placed the probability that the evidence would warrant conviction at about 52 percent and the probability that the Senate would actually convict at 35 percent. These were disciplined point estimates separating two questions that impeachment necessarily combines: whether the record justifies conviction and whether 16 senator-judges will vote for it.

Why the Merits Have Strengthened

The merits estimate has since risen to 70 percent, principally because of Article I, involving confidential funds in the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Education. The case began with Commission on Audit findings, unusual acknowledgment receipts and large cash withdrawals, but those facts initially left a substantial gap between administrative irregularity and Duterte’s personal responsibility.

Former OVP special disbursing officer Gina Acosta materially narrowed that gap. She testified that she released four PHP 125 million tranches, or PHP 500 million in total, to Col. Raymund Lachica on Duterte’s instruction. Acosta was the designated disbursing officer; Lachica was a security officer. Her testimony therefore placed Duterte directly at the decision to transfer control of the money from the officer formally accountable for its disbursement.

OVP Assistant Secretary Lemuel Ortonio then testified that Duterte knew about and authorized the confidential fund activities and their implementation. His testimony also reinforced the unusual compartmentalization of the system: Senior officials involved in preparing documents and responding to auditors said they had little or no personal knowledge of how the money was actually spent, while Duterte and Lachica were identified as the people who knew how the operations were implemented.

The Department of Education evidence has made the OVP arrangement more consequential because it suggests repetition rather than an isolated administrative mistake. Former DepEd Undersecretary Michael Poa confirmed that Duterte ordered the transfer of PHP 112.5 million in confidential funds to security officer Col. Dennis Nolasco. Poa also confirmed that no DepEd confidential funds were given to the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the Youth Leadership Summits cited in military certifications used in the department’s response to COA. Army officers separately testified that their units funded their own participation.

What the Evidence Does – and Does Not – Prove

This does not prove that Duterte stole the money, personally enriched herself or ordered fictitious transactions. COA’s audit was largely documentary, and unusual names on acknowledgment receipts do not by themselves establish fictitious recipients. An impeachment verdict does not require proof of plunder beyond a reasonable doubt. The Senate is deciding whether sufficiently clear and convincing evidence establishes conduct grave enough to constitute an impeachable breach of public trust.

On that standard, Article I is now conviction-capable without proof that a peso entered Duterte’s pocket. A senator-judge could reasonably find that repeated transfers of confidential cash to security officers outside the formal disbursement structure, personally authorized by the head of the agency and followed by deficient or questionable liquidation, constitute sufficiently grave official misconduct. The defense can still show that the arrangements were legally authorized and the underlying operations genuine, but the burden of explanation has become heavier.

Other Routes to Conviction

Article IV, involving Duterte’s statements about killing President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the first lady and former Speaker Martin Romualdez, remains a second possible route to conviction. The recorded statements themselves are not seriously in doubt. A Quezon City court has separately found probable cause in three grave threats cases, although that finding is not proof of an impeachable offense. The prosecution’s stronger theory remains whether the vice president’s own public conduct was sufficiently grave to betray the trust attached to her office; the attempt to prove an operational assassination conspiracy remains less developed.

Article II, concerning unexplained wealth, is the largest unresolved variable. The prosecution has received subpoenaed bank and tax records involving Duterte, her husband and related entities, but those records have not yet been developed in open trial. Until they are presented and tested, they should add little to a verdict assessment. The possible decision to drop the bribery allegation under Article III may also sharpen the prosecution’s case by concentrating on stronger allegations.

The Gap Between the Case and the Votes

This progression explains the arc of our merits outlook: 52 percent after the opening days, 57 percent after the bank and COA phase, 61 percent after Acosta, 65 percent after correcting for the proper impeachment standard, 68 percent after examining the duties of the special disbursing officer and head of the agency, and 70 percent today. The political probability has moved much less: 35 percent, 39 percent, 45 percent, 45 percent, 46 percent and now 47 percent.

The reason is the constitutional vote requirement. Presiding Officer Francis Escudero has ruled that conviction requires 16 affirmative votes, two-thirds of the full 24-member Senate. Some senators have discussed whether that threshold should be revisited because several colleagues are detained, suspended or otherwise absent, but 16 remains the operative rule.

Under the working Senate alignment used throughout these outlooks, 12 senators are presently more likely to vote for conviction. Reaching 16 still requires four senators from the opposing bloc to move. The evidence is now strong enough to make such defections plausible, especially among senators whose positions are driven more by institutional or pragmatic considerations than by loyalty to Duterte, but not yet strong enough to make four switches the more likely outcome.

That produces the central tension in the current outlook. On the merits, conviction is now favored at about 70 percent; in the actual Senate, conviction remains a slight underdog at about 47 percent. The gap reflects the structure of impeachment itself: The prosecution can build a case that warrants conviction without automatically producing the supermajority needed to impose it.

What Could Change the Outlook

The next major movement is likely to come from strong corroborating financial evidence under Article II or from visible movement among the senator-judges who can supply the four votes still missing. For now, the case against Duterte has strengthened faster than the coalition required to convict her.

Disclosure: This article is based solely on open-source and publicly available information, including official records, public testimony, court and legislative materials, published reports and other information available to the general public. It does not rely on confidential briefings, private communications or information provided directly by any individual, counsel, senator-judge, government office, political actor or institution participating in or connected to the impeachment trial.