Moral turpitude

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

The recent petition filed to disqualify former Sen. Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., who is also known as BBM, from his nickname Bongbong and his surname Marcos, as a presidential candidate in the 2022 National and Local Elections, quoted the case of MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, Respondents (G. R. No. 219603, Jan. 26, 2016).  

The decision for the Supreme Court en banc was written by Justice Antonio Carpio, who is now the lead convenor of 1Sambayan.  

By way of a backgrounder, in the case of Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines (G. R. Nos. 161032 and 161176, Sept. 16, 2008), the Supreme Court, convicted Philip Pichay with 4 counts of libel. “In lieu of imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision became final and executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.”

On Oct. 9, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman of the 1^st District of Surigao del Sur for the May 13, 2013 elections. Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado was also running for congresswoman.

In Feb. 18, 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Comelec. She said that he was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that since he paid the fine on Feb. 17, 2011, “the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.”  

Pichay filed his answer on Mar. 4, 2013, admitting “his conviction by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company.” This case was raffled to the Comelec’s First Divison.

After counting the votes cast, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected congressman. This forced Ty-Delgado to file a petition before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as congressman.

Meantime, the Comelec’s First Division dismissed the petition for disqualification for lack of jurisdiction.

In Mar. 18, 2015, the HRET held that “there is nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in any way in writing the libelous articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company.” It concluded that “Pichay’s conviction for libel showed that the crime did not involve moral turpitude.”

Aggrieved, Ty-Delgado filed this special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

The  Supreme Court granted the petition. It reversed the decision of the HRET  and declared Ty-Delgado as winner over Pichay for the position of Congressman, holding that “Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.”

The Court stated that “the sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.” It quoted Sec. 12 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (The Omnibus Election Code):chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who x x x has been sentenced by final judgment  x x x for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.”

“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.” (Emphasis supplied)

It explained that:

“Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.^”

The Court noted that Pichay admitted “his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed an “act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or society in general,” and an act which is “contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”

Pichay had alleged that, since he was only fined, the crime of libel for which he was convicted did not involve moral turpitude.

The Court stated that “the imposition of a fine does not determine whether the crime involves moral turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections (G. R. No. 148326, Nov. 15, 2001), we held that a crime still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, we explained that a fine was imposed on the accused since they were first time offenders.”

“Under Section 12,” the Court said, “disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence. x x x. x x x since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.”

The Court then concluded that:

“Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay’s disqualification under Section 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

“Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x.”

“Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five, days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.” (Emphases supplied)

The Supreme Court found “that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.  Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based on the Provincial Canvass Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado.^”