May a petition for nullity of marriage that was denied be refiled?

By Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes III

In the legal realm, a paradigm shift in jurisprudential-trending reverberates in its every corner.

This could not be more true than with the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Tan-Andal v. Andal which came down on May 11, 2021.    Here, the doctrinal trajectory had gone the other way from being a strict medical concept to a legal one.

The ripple that had caused the waves in this case is the legal meaning of “psychological incapacity” which renders a marriage void under Article 36 of the New Family Code. This term had for the longest time eluded a clear definition. The leading case law that is the provenance of this discussion is Republic v. Molina that interpreted the concept of “psychological incapacity” to be a strict medical or psychological condition that must be diagnosed by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist and because of its strictness, had spawned a multitude of petitions for nullity of marriage to be denied for falling short of its guidelines.

To appreciate the full measure of the stringency of the requirements in Molina, here are some of the salient guidelines that were laid down in the said case:

(1) x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, ( c) sufficiently proven by experts and ( d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.xx x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x

(7)x x x

(8)xx x The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. (Go-Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, 03 April 2019, emphasis and underlining supplied).

This rigidness was somehow tempered by subsequent pronouncements that held that testimonies of experts are only advisable but not mandatory.    (Go-Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, 03 April 2019). And yet still, “X x x According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental-not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,  include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In this accord, psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.” (Juanita E. Cahapisan-Santiago v. James Paul A. Santiago, G.R. No. 241144. June 26, 2019, emphasis and underlining supplied).

But as to the psychiatric opinion, the Court has ruled in a recent decision that the facts upon which the opinion is founded need not necessarily be based on the personal knowledge of the doctor (Bernardine S. Santos-Gantan v. John-Ross C. Gantan, G.R. No. 225193. October 14, 2020).

These later rulings now usher in Tan-Andal v. Andal which as earlier said was handed down only on 11 May 2021 where it was held that the diagnosis of a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessary considering that psychological incapacity is a “legal, not a medical concept”; and further, that the psychological make-up of the spouse or spouses need not be characterized by “incurability”. This  will surely loosen up the rigorous requirements for proving the psychological malady that had befuddled courts since the Family Code was enacted in August 1988. Henceforth, the chances of getting a favorable decision from the family courts for petitions filed under Article 36 would surely significantly improve.

But curiously, can this be applied retrospectively so as to provide succour to the thousands  of party-litigants whose petitions were denied based on the exacting guidelines of Molina? In any case, jurisprudence also holds that a person’s status is in rem and thus res judicata cannot apply (Edna S. Kondo, represented by Attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda S. Pineda v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 223628. March 4, 2020). “Hence, petitions directed against the “thing” itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, as in the instant case, are actions in rem.” (Alba v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005). “In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. (Roehr v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003).

The collective effect of these rulings can be summed-up into one rule: that a person’s civil status is in rem (meaning it is one that is binding against the whole world). Thus, if a person’s marriage is void, then it is void in whichever crevice in the world that such person may be found. So if a person files a petition to annul or have his marriage declared void and it is denied for some reason, it is the humble submission of this column that it may be refiled once the same person finds better grounds to support his/ her petition. This is further bolstered by the very fresh ruling in Tan-Andal where expert medical opinion is no longer required and the meaning of psychological incapacity had been released from the strait-jacket requirement of “incurability”. More important, the Tan-Andal doctrine was meant to be curative in nature- to correct the constrictive interpretation that was made in Molina.

If the Supreme Court has the power to interpret the law as having a retroactive effect when it is curative in nature, perhaps with more reason that it can do so with the case law that it carves out. And since the settled-rule is that res judicata (which is a latin term that means a previous ruling prohibits the refiling of the same case), does not apply to petitions involving the civil status of persons, then with the same parity of reasoning, previous petitions for nullity of marriage which were denied on account of the rigorousness of Molina, should be allowed to be refiled. Those previously denied petitions should be given another chance: this time in the light of the less demanding guidelines of Tan-Andal.

In the end, if there is something that needs to be cured, more than the psychological impairment itself, it is the state of being imprisoned in a loveless and incurably hopeless marriage. For it has been ruled that “Judicial power x xx recognizes and rests upon the great moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man to a million, or from a million to one man.” (Justice Jay in Grisholm v. Georgia [1792]).

(The author is the senior partner of ET Reyes III & Associates– a law firm based in Iloilo City. He is a litigation attorney, a law professor and a law book author. His website is etriiilaw.com).