Iloilo airport protocol broke at worst time

By Francis Allan L. Angelo

Let’s cut through the noise and the panic-scrolling. The shooting at Iloilo International Airport on Wednesday was a design flaw in our search for convenience.

We don’t need hot takes or clickbait right now. We need to look at the hard facts: a system update meant to speed up queues inadvertently created a 15-minute blind spot that nearly cost lives.

Let’s break down the gap in the protocol and, more importantly, how we fix it without turning the terminal into a fortress.

As to accountability, let the process work but we should not let our guards down (just maintain your sane reasoning).

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A security lapse at Iloilo International Airport on Wednesday, Jan. 28, 2026, ended in a shooting after a passenger allegedly pulled a knife at the pre-departure screening area and tried to stab people, including a responding police officer.

The incident happened amid a recent operational change at the passenger terminal, where the initial security check at the main entrance was removed to prevent congestion and speed up entry into the building.

Under the post-change protocol described by authorities, the police are supposed to be positioned at the final screening or central security screening area so they can respond immediately when Office of Transportation Security screeners detect prohibited items.

In this case, there was no police officer at the final screening when the X-ray machine flagged a bladed weapon inside a passenger’s baggage, leaving OTS personnel to call for police backup.

Airport officials said it took about 15 to 16 minutes before police arrived, a delay that became critical once the passenger refused to comply.

Police identified the suspect as Roland B. Lañojan, 54, a security guard and resident of Tayong, Sagay, Camiguin, who was set to board a Cebu Pacific flight to Cebu scheduled to depart at 7:02 p.m.

Two spot reports placed the start of the incident at around 4:44 p.m., while another narrative put the report to police at about 5 p.m., a discrepancy that investigators can clarify through CCTV, radio logs, and OTS incident records.

The Iloilo Airport Police Station said OTS personnel reported that a passenger refused inspection at the central screening checkpoint after an X-ray image indicated what appeared to be a bladed weapon inside his bag.

Responding police identified as Police Executive Master Sgt. Dixon E. Zabala, Police Senior Master Sgt. Mark Lester Deocades and Patrolman Ramon D. Marcelino Jr. went to the screening area to verify and assist, according to official reports.

Police said the screener asked Lañojan to open his bag for manual inspection, but he allegedly tried to flee with the bag and then retrieved a knife.

Authorities said Lañojan attempted to stab passengers and the responding officers and repeatedly tried to stab PEMS Zabala, who evaded and then fired his service firearm once, hitting the suspect on the shoulder.

The airport medical team took Lañojan to Western Visayas Sanitarium Hospital in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, for treatment, and police said he was placed under arrest and will face criminal charges.

The Iloilo Provincial Forensic Unit conducted a scene-of-the-crime operation, and a motu proprio investigation by the Internal Affairs Section is underway.

𝗦𝗢𝗟𝗨𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡𝗦

If the situation warrants it, and in keeping with national and international aviation rules, the initial check can be restored at the main entrance as an added layer. If that aspect was removed administratively by the concerned agency, such as the Department of Transportation, it can be readily restored.

Beyond the armed confrontation itself, the episode exposed a procedural gap created by the removal of the entrance scanner, because the intended safeguard was police presence at the final screening, and that presence was not in place when the X-ray detected the knife.

The practical effect was that OTS personnel had to hold the situation without immediate law enforcement support, and the response clock started only after a call for police assistance rather than at the moment the threat was detected.

A tighter security setup can be achieved even without restoring the entrance screening, but it requires treating the final screening as the new “front line” and staffing it accordingly.

One immediate fix is a permanent, clearly visible aviation police post inside or directly beside the central security screening area, with officers assigned per shift and prohibited from being pulled away without relief.

The airport can adopt a written response-time standard, such as a maximum two-minute arrival time to any lane at final screening, and require supervisors to log and review every breach of that standard after each shift.

OTS and the aviation police can implement a direct-alert system, such as a panic button at each screening lane and a dedicated radio channel, so the screener does not lose seconds making calls while managing a noncompliant passenger.

A small “secondary inspection bay” can be set up immediately after the X-ray conveyor, where flagged bags and passengers are moved away from the queue and into a controlled space with a clear line of sight for police and CCTV coverage.

Frontline screeners and police should run joint drills for prohibited-item detection, refusal-to-comply scenarios, and crowd control, so the handoff between OTS and police is automatic and not improvised under stress.

If the airport decides to restore an initial check at the entrance, it can be redesigned as a congestion-control layer rather than a full screening point, with clear signage, more queuing space, and peak-hour staffing that prevents backups from spilling outside.

If the entrance check remains removed, the airport should compensate by adding lanes, adjusting staffing by flight banks, and improving passenger messaging so fewer prohibited items reach the final checkpoint in the first place.

Passenger-facing measures can include prominent “no knives, no bladed tools” warnings from curb to check-in, plus announcements and visual boards that remind travelers to repack or surrender prohibited items before they reach screening.

Accountability can be strengthened by requiring a daily joint briefing between airport management, OTS, and aviation police that confirms the day’s post assignments at the final screening and identifies peak periods that need reinforcement.

The OTS can also be “armed” with less-lethal defensive tools plus strict rules, training, and medical safeguards,” but never a substitute for police presence.

Here are ways to do that:

𝘼𝙙𝙙 𝙡𝙚𝙨𝙨-𝙡𝙚𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙡 𝙩𝙤𝙤𝙡𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙊𝙏𝙎 𝙨𝙘𝙧𝙚𝙚𝙣𝙚𝙧𝙨

Authorize trained OTS personnel at Iloilo International Airport to carry less-lethal defensive equipment such as pepper spray and conducted energy devices, commonly known as tasers, strictly for last-resort self-defense and to hold a suspect until police arrive.

𝙈𝙖𝙠𝙚 𝙞𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙖𝙡, 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙖𝙪𝙩𝙤𝙢𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙘

Limit deployment to situations where a passenger becomes violent or presents an immediate threat, especially when the suspect has already produced a bladed weapon.

𝘽𝙪𝙞𝙡𝙙 𝙜𝙪𝙖𝙧𝙙𝙧𝙖𝙞𝙡𝙨 𝙨𝙤 𝙞𝙩 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙜𝙚𝙩 𝙖𝙗𝙪𝙨𝙚𝙙

Require certification training, clear use-of-force rules, and body camera coverage at screening lanes, plus mandatory incident reporting and review for every deployment.

𝙎𝙚𝙩 𝙢𝙚𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙡 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙨𝙖𝙛𝙚𝙩𝙮 𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙩𝙤𝙘𝙤𝙡𝙨

Require post-incident medical checks, especially for people hit with pepper spray or a taser, and coordinate ambulance or clinic readiness inside the terminal.

𝘿𝙚𝙛𝙞𝙣𝙚 𝙬𝙝𝙤 𝙘𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙞𝙚𝙨 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙬𝙝𝙚𝙧𝙚

Assign only designated, trained OTS officers per shift to carry less-lethal tools, positioned at the final screening lanes and secondary inspection bay where prohibited items are most likely to be discovered.

𝙆𝙚𝙚𝙥 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙢𝙖𝙞𝙣 𝙛𝙞𝙭 𝙞𝙣 𝙥𝙡𝙖𝙘𝙚

Emphasize that less-lethal tools are a backup layer, not a replacement for aviation police presence at the final screening area, which should remain the primary rapid-response measure.

The core lesson is simple: removing one layer of screening to ease congestion can work, but only if the replacement controls, especially immediate police presence at the final checkpoint, are nonnegotiable and consistently enforced.