Fellatio in 1915

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

 

The case of Eloisa Goitia De La Camara versus Jose Campos Rueda (G. R. No. 11263, Nov. 2, 1916) is a fascinating glimpse behind the bedroom door into marital sex in the Philippines at the turn of the 20^th Century. I thought that a case like this will never again make it to the courts and even to the Supreme Court in our time.

But I was mistaken. The case of People of the Philippines versus Edgar Jumawan (G. R. 187497, April 21, 2014) did reach the Court. It held that,

“Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

My dear Reader, People vs. Jumawan and marital rape is another story for another day. Now, let us go back to old Manila and the story of Eloisa in Goitia vs. Campos Rueda.

 

Jose and Eloisa were married on Jan. 7, 1915 in Manila. They lived together for a month. Then Eloisa abruptly returned to her parents’ house. She filed a complaint against Jose for support outside the conjugal domicile. Her complaint alleged:

 

“That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff were unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.”

 

The Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled “that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, x x x.” Eloisa appealed to the Supreme Court.

 

The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s decision. It held that marriage “is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make.”

 

The Court explained that the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 and the Civil Code “fix the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.” The Court then asked this question, “May the husband, on account of his conduct towards his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay pension?”

 

The Court said,

 

“The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental house. A judgment for separate maintenance is x x x a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.”

 

Now, the fellatio or blow-job, which Jose wanted Eloisa to perform, is now considered rape under Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as “The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.” Thus,

“Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. – Rape is committed: 1) x x x. 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of  sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the gental or anal orifice of another person.” 

My dear Reader, blowjob was refused in 1915 and the wife left her husband. The consequence was that the husband had to support his wife. If the facts of this case happened in our times, I submit that the husband will also face a charge of marital rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A, RA 8353.

I assure everyone that the sexual acts and antics behind the bedroom door have not changed. They remain the same. But the penalties did and they became harsher. Bob Dylan said it best in 1964 when he sang, “For the times they are a-changin.”