EAT BULAGA! Rape and its consequences

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

 

The Honorable Rep. Romeo G. Jalosjos, who represented the 1^st District of Zamboanga del Norte in the House of Representatives (HOR), was one of the richest members of the House of Representatives. He is the Chairman of the Board of Television And Production Exponents Inc. (TAPE Inc.). TAPE Inc. is a TV company founded in 1978 and is a partner of GMA Network Inc. It is the producer and franchise-owner of the nation’s longest running noontime variety show Eat Bulaga! since 1979, among several TV dramas, shown and/or showing at the GMA, ABS-CBN, IBC, RPN and TV5 stations. He owns the famous Dakak Park and Beach Resorts in Dapitan City.

In 1996, Jalosjos was accused of raping an 11-year-old girl, while he was a first-term congressman. He was arrested in 1997 in Bagac, Bataan and was detained at the Makati City Jail. In December 1997, the Makati Regional Trial Court (Br. 62) found Jalosjos guilty of 2 counts of statutory rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness. He was then transferred to the New Bilibid Prison in 1998. But despite his conviction, Jalosjos managed to run for re-election and won in the 1998 and 2001 elections. He held his post until the Supreme Court upheld his conviction with finality in 2002. His name was subsequently dropped from the list of members of the House of Representatives. In a special elections held to fill the vacancy caused by his ouster, his sister Rep. Cecilia G. Jalosjos-Carreon won.

On Nov. 16, 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Jalosjos in the case of People of the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos (G. R. Nos. 132875-76). He was then “sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.”

In 2007, President Arroyo commuted Jaloslos’ sentence and, after serving the same, he was discharged from prison in March 2009, having spent 12 years in jail. In April 2012, he applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. The Election Officer denied his application. He then filed a petition for inclusion in the permanent list of voters with the municipal trial court. Pending the petition’s resolution, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for city mayor on Oct. 5, 2012. He alleged that he is a voter therein and that he wanted to run for city mayor in the coming local elections set for May 13, 2013. Thereafter, the MTC denied his petition, which the regional trial court affirmed on appeal.  Meantime, 5 petitions were filed before the Commission on Elections’ First and Second Divisions. These prayed for either the denial or the cancellation of his CoC.

On Jan. 15, 2013, COMELEC en banc canceled and denied his CoC, motu proprio “due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.” Jalosjos then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the order of the COMELEC.

The Court en banc promulgated its decision in this case – Romeo G. Jaloslos, Petitioner, v. The Commission on Elections, et al., Respondents (G. R. No. 205033, June 13, 2013) – after the May 13, 2013 elections. It was penned By Justice Perlas-Bernabe. It affirmed the decision of the COMELEC en banc. It said that this case “had already been mooted by the exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 elections. Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the bench and the bar in the future, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the same.”

First, Jalosjos claimed “that the COMELEC en banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions’ jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio petitioner’s CoC x x x, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SEC. 3. x x x. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

The Court stated that the “above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may take action is confined only in cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC’s exercise of administrative functions.” It then distinguished administrative functions and quasi-judicial functions. It then explained that:

“Even without a petition, x x x, the COMELEC is under a legal obligation to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.” x x x. The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of ‘all laws’ relating to the conduct of elections.”

Thus, it said “(t)he COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to ‘enforce and administer all laws’ relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.” In this case, the COMELEC “merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling the petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.”

Second, Jalosjos claimed that Art. 30 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was partially amended by Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC). Thus, “his perpetual absolute disqualification had already been removed.”

The Court cited the statutory construction rule that “every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.”

The LGC provides that “SEC. 40. Disqualifications. – The following are disqualified from running for any elective position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; x x x.” 

On the other hand, the RPC provides that “ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. – The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: x x x. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office. x x x.”

The Court reconciled the 2 provisions. It ruled that Sec. 40(a) of the LGC “should be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for public office.” It cited Art 41 of the RPC as an example. Thus:

“ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. – Their accessory penalties. – The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case maybe, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even through pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.”

The Court explained that “this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office.”

In addition, the Court pointed out that “Article 30 of the RPC is more direct and specific in nature – insofar as it deprives the candidate to run for elective office due to conviction – as compared to Section 40(a) of the LGC x x x.” Citing the principle of lex specialis derogate generali – general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable,” it held that Sec. 40(a) of the LGC “should be considered as a law of general application and therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions.”

The Court then concluded, “petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision – such as Article 41 in this case – directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapsed of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.”

The Court then noted, “Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioner’s disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsists.”

“All told,” the Court said, ”applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly, considering the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which petitioner continues to suffer. Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC. WHEREFORE, the petition, is DISMISSED.”

Jalosjos’ son and namesake – Rep. Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., a. k. a. Jon-jon – is the incumbent congressman in the 1^st District of Zambonaga del Norte in the 18^th Congress (2019-2022). His brother, former Cong. Seth Frederick “Bullet” Jalosjos, whom he replaced as congressman, ran for goverrnor in 2019 but lost to incumbent Governor Robert Uy, Jr. In January 26, 2019 and just prior to the elections, Cong. Bullet Jalosjos, in an article which appeared in the INQUIRER.NET, said:

“At a very young age, I had to deal with the stigma of my family name. I was insecure. My schoolmates and even my friends said hurtful things to me about my father. I saw how friends of my dad and friends of our family abandoned and left us as if we had a communicable disease.” 

And about his father:

“Those who truly know my father, they know that he has a passion for helping others. You can say what you want, but you can never undo his innate kindness and generosity. Especially after he sees the situation of many inmates. I saw a lot of good examples to live by from my father and one of those is to always have a helping hand.”