Driving daddy’s car

By Atty. Rolex T. Suplico

 

Are Local Government Units (LGUs) liable for the defective conditions of roads, streets, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision?

The answer, my dear Reader, is a resounding yes.

This is based on Art. 2189 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that,

“Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.”

This was tested in the decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. NO. 150304, promulgated on June 15, 2005, in the case of a QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON, Petitioners, v. FULGENCIO DACARA, Respondent. The decision was written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, Jr., before he was appointed as the 21st Supreme Court Chief Justice of the Philippines, from 2005 to 2006.

On February 28, 1988 at around 1am, minor “Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government.” As a result, the car turned turtle and sustained extensive damage after it hit the pile of dirt. Fulgencio, Jr., was injured.

After negotiations broke down, Fulgencio, Sr., sued the Quezon Cty government, on behalf of his minor son, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The “defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid an accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care.” Finding the defendants negligent, the trial court ruled in favor of the Dacaras, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of evidence presented by the plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating the negligent acts of the city government together with its employees when considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit.”

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which, however, agreed with the trial court’s “finding that petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.”

Aggrieved, the Quezon City Government filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the CA and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

The Court sustained the decisions of both the CA and the trial court based on ample evidence, which “x x x, clearly point to petitioners’ negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent’s car.” It defined proximate cause “as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.”

The Court said that this is a factual issue and “absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions,” it will stand by the findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. It then quoted with approval the findings of the trial court:

“Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle, was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident. x x x. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.” ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

However, the Court did not award moral damages, which it said, “are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.”

It held that, aside from the self-serving testimony of the Fulgencio, Jr., that “he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever,” no other proof was presented. In fact, the decisions of the trial court and the CA “are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of respondent that his moral sufferings are due to the negligence of the petitioners.” In particular, the trial court’s decision “makes no mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.”

“To award moral damages,” it said that, “a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury – – whether physical, mental, or psychological – – clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. x x x. Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court also awarded exemplary damages based on Art. 2231 of the New Civil Code, which “mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of others. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case. A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of both the CA and the trial court.”

The Court held that the “facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the street was dimly lit, the need for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety. Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross negligence on their part. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures.”

There is a pronouncement made by the Court, which, my dear Reader, applies to all LGUs:

“Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.”

In summary, the Supreme Court partly granted the petition for review of the Quezon City Government. It affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with a modification that the award for moral damages was deleted.