Countering disinformation through legislation

By Michael Henry Yusingco, LL.M

According to the committee report released by the Tri-Comm of the House of Representatives, “existing laws and institutions are grossly inadequate and ill-equipped to combat well-orchestrated and well-funded campaigns to spread disinformation, manipulate public perception, and destabilize democratic institutions.” Sadly, the report also shows that most lawmakers are likewise “grossly inadequate and ill-equipped” to craft a regulatory framework to counter disinformation.

Around the world, governments are tightening their grip on online falsehoods. The Center for International Media Assistance reports that 78 countries have enacted laws targeting digital disinformation, with many choosing to criminalize its creation and spread. The Philippines aims to follow this course of action. Our lawmakers have fully embraced the idea of legislating against every form of harmful online content — and they want to do it through a single, sweeping statute.

But the omnibus approach is problematic. Case in point is the Omnibus Election Code. This is an antiquated statute that was designed to encompass all matters pertaining to the conduct of elections. Through the years, segments have been replaced by new laws to address the needs of the times. The lesson to be learned in this instance is that when legislators attempt to police an entire ecosystem of falsehoods with one law, the result is almost always doctrinal confusion, political overreach, and poor enforcement.

Specifically, the primary obstacle here is conceptual clutter. When an omnibus bill attempts to capture libel, obscenity, election-related falsehoods, coordinated digital manipulation, foreign interference, platform responsibilities, and AI-generated deception all at once, it becomes a legally incoherent package. Citizens cannot understand it. Courts struggle to apply it.

Complexity quickly turns into regulatory elasticity. Vague multi-category statutes invite governments to interpret harms on the fly. In weaker democracies, this becomes a convenient way to suppress dissent or intimidate political opponents. But even in stronger democracies, overly broad disinformation laws can chill speech, deter scrutiny, and concentrate power in the hands of regulators.

A more disciplined approach is to break the problem down by context. Not all falsehoods are equal. Libel is a personal injury. Obscenity is a moral infraction. Election manipulation is a threat to democratic integrity. Malign foreign interference is a national security issue. Conceptually each would demand its own policy instrument or legislation.

For instance, one of the most pressing areas where the Philippines needs clarity is foreign interference. The country is increasingly exposed to foreign influence operations, whether through coordinated messaging campaigns, digital manipulation, or covert support for domestic actors.

The first challenge in legislating a regulatory response is formulating the offenses and state actions. Notably, “foreign influence” and “foreign interference” are often used interchangeably, yet they refer to entirely different things. Influence can be legitimate; interference seeks to covertly shape political outcomes.

The Philippines engages in constant international cooperation — from development assistance to foreign investments and regional security partnerships. Treating all foreign involvement as suspicious would be disastrous. A foreign interference law must therefore distinguish between normal cross-border engagement and covert activity that subverts sovereignty or manipulates domestic political processes.

This means precise definitions, not broad strokes. The law should articulate specific criteria for what constitutes interference: intent, concealment of origin, coordination with foreign principals, and demonstrable impact on political institutions or public decision-making. It should also establish a clear process for determining when a foreign actor, organization, or activity crosses that line.

The implementation challenge is serious as well. Foreign interference operations today are a mix of digital propaganda, data-driven targeting, covert funding, and strategic amplification via AI-driven tools. Effective monitoring requires a technical capacity that the Philippine bureaucracy currently does not have. Any foreign interference law will therefore need an enforcement strategy that matches the sophistication of the threat.

More importantly, surveillance powers must be carefully delineated. Monitoring influence operations requires visibility into digital networks, financial flows, and organizational relationships. But such powers can easily bleed into inappropriate monitoring of civil society, journalists, or political opposition. To prevent overreach, the law needs strong guardrails such as judicial authorization, clear thresholds, strict data-handling rules, and robust independent oversight.

The point is simple: clarity in the legislation is indispensable. The more precisely the law defines its targets, the harder it becomes for political actors to weaponize it. And the more tailored the legislative tools, the more effective the state becomes in addressing real threats rather than imagined ones.