AGAINST THE TIDE: Boracay navigates the cost of connectivity
(Part 1 of 2) This is a two‑part investigative report. Part One examines the consequences of projects built for the sake of development. Part Two analyzes the legal defenses of local opposition and discusses what happens if these fail. MALAY, AKLAN — For years, Malay and the wider province of

By Gabrielli Isabelle A. Barrios
By Gabrielli Isabelle A. Barrios
(Part 1 of 2)
This is a two‑part investigative report. Part One examines the consequences of projects built for the sake of development. Part Two analyzes the legal defenses of local opposition and discusses what happens if these fail.
MALAY, AKLAN — For years, Malay and the wider province of Aklan have shaped infrastructure development on their own terms. The system relies on jetty ports moving around 6,000 tourists daily, provincial coffers collecting over P600 million annually from terminal fees, boat cooperatives investing nearly P368 million in modernized vessels, small businesses thriving around them, and a “One Entry–One Exit” ordinance preserving Boracay’s fragile carrying capacity. It is a tourism economy balanced against environmental limits: messy, incremental, but locally driven.
Then came an unsolicited proposal from San Miguel Holdings Corporation (SMHC): a 2.54-kilometer limited-access toll bridge connecting mainland Aklan directly to Boracay Island.
Every level of local government has formally rejected the project. The provincial board opposed it through Resolutions No. 193-2025, 588-2026, and 593-2026. The Malay municipal council removed it from its Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Annual Investment Plan with its Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions No. 096-2025, 106-2025, and 060-2026. The barangay government of Caticlan also voiced opposition through Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 049-2025. Widespread rejection also came from boatmen cooperatives, multi-sectoral communities, business owners, and the Catholic Church.
Yet on March 25, 2026, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded the P7.78‑billion Boracay Bridge contract to SMHC in accordance with Republic Act No. 11966. The Notice of Award followed on March 30, 2026.

This is not merely a dispute over a bridge. It is a test of whether local autonomy holds any weight when private corporations enter the development picture. With the fate of the Philippines’ most famous tourist destination hanging in the balance, this investigation examines how one megaproject exposes the fault lines between local democratic will, national economic agendas, and corporate profit.
MOUNTING OPPOSITION
The timeline of opposition is extensive and multi‑sectoral. On October 12, 2024, the Boracay Foundation Inc., a nonprofit representing business and property owners, issued Resolution No. 006. Days later, the Malay Ports Services Multi‑Purpose Cooperative followed with Resolution No. 5 on November 9, 2024, and the Caticlan‑Boracay Transport Multi‑Purpose Cooperative issued Resolution No. 32 on November 12, 2024.
Early 2025 saw more opposition. On February 6, the Boracay Land and Sea‑Port Boat Transport Association, Inc. (BORALAND) sent a letter‑petition to the Punong Barangay of Caticlan, Ralf Tolosa. Four days later, on February 10, the Malay Tricycle Operators and Drivers Association (MATODA) addressed its own letter‑petition to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan.
Then, on July 2, 2025, the Malay Municipal Council took a decisive step: it removed the bridge project from its Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Annual Investment Plan.
On October 8, 2025, through Resolution No. 193-2025, the Aklan Provincial Board formally opposed the bridge on multiple grounds: the absence of public consultation, environmental risks to marine ecosystems, livelihood threats to over 40 regular employees, 414 boatmen under Caticlan-Boracay Transport Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CBTMPC) with 64 units of motorized boats and 2,200 family members, potential loss of over P600 million in annual revenue from jetty port fees, and possible violation of the provincial ordinance 05-032 (One Entry–One Exit Policy).
On November 1, 2025, Archbishop Victor Bendico, the archbishop of Capiz and apostolic administrator of the Kalibo Diocese, issued a pastoral statement warning against “repeating the same mistakes” that led to the island’s temporary closure in 2018.
The 2018 closure was a direct response to the island exceeding its carrying capacity. Sewage systems were overwhelmed, and the waters degraded.
The question now confronting planners is whether any comprehensive study has been conducted on how the bridge—and the inevitable increase in visitors it would facilitate—will affect Boracay’s sewage, water, and waste systems.
The Boracay Foundation Inc. (BFI) has been pressing for exactly such an assessment. In a letter received by Malacañang on March 18, 2026, BFI asked President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to intervene and “halt any movement toward the project; require a current, independent, science‑based Environmental Impact Assessment; and direct transparent and inclusive stakeholder consultations.” The Office of the President acknowledged receipt and endorsed the letter to the appropriate government agency for evaluation, with Deputy Executive Secretary Danielle Marie S. Riemann Culangen referring the letter to DPWH Secretary Vince Dizon.
In response to DPWH awarding the contract to SMHC, on April 8, 2026, the Aklan Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 588, reiterating its opposition. On April 15, 2026, it approved a resolution strongly denouncing the DPWH’s award and requested the PPP Center to furnish all documents related to the proposal, bidding, and negotiations.
“Considering its short distance from the mainland, the construction of the bridge would adversely affect marine ecology, which is irreparable once the damage has been done. It would take generations for ecological restoration,” warned Engr. Allyn Artates of the Provincial Engineering Office.
Hon. Atty. Reynaldo M. Quimpo, current Board Member and then-Vice Governor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when it enacted Resolution No. 193-2025, detailed how the proposed bridge would disrupt the existing transport ecosystem to the island.
“On a legal ground of objection, the province maintains a One Entry–One Exit ordinance, regulating the entry into and out of Boracay only through Caticlan and Cagban Jetty Ports, and seasonally during Habagat, in Tabon and Tambisaan Port, operated under the Municipality of Malay. As a provincial ordinance, it is binding upon all, even those from outside of Aklan,” Atty. Quimpo explained the violation of another access point from the proposed bridge cited in the provincial resolution.
According to Engr. Artates, the existing ferry system already moves an average of 6,000 passengers daily, departing multiple boats simultaneously across a narrow 1.2-kilometer channel in 10 to 15 minutes.
She disclosed that in 2022, Boracay’s tourism carrying capacity, the absolute environmental limit set by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), is 25,355 persons per day, while the current allowable tourist arrival is capped at 8,452 persons per day.
Yet on page 17 of the Project Information Memorandum, the entire system is designed to handle only 4,373 passengers per day. That is the maximum number of tourists the bridge could move, operating well below even the existing regulatory limit, let alone the island’s physical threshold.
This critical limitation is even supported by Atty. Quimpo, who questioned the bridge’s promise of convenience.

“As a two-lane bridge, one lane in each direction, hypothetically using vans with a carrying capacity of 20 passengers would require 300 one-way trips to cater to the daily 6,000 passengers demand. Congestion would likely occur both on the bridge itself and at the terminal areas for embarkation and disembarkation,” Atty. Quimpo explained. “So based on time and motion, it’s even faster to take multiple boat vessels at once.”
FISCAL AND ECONOMIC COST
Opposition to the bridge is rooted not only in environmental risks or cultural disruption, but in cold, hard fiscal reality. The Caticlan and Cagban Jetty Ports, under the Provincial Government of Aklan, and during Habagat season, Tabon and Tambisaan Ports, under the Municipal Government of Malay, generate local revenue. Resolution No. 193-2025 quantifies a combined annual income of over P600 million in revenue to support medical and social services.
“Seventy-five percent of the revenue goes to medical services, mainly to subsidize our provincial, municipal, and district hospitals. The remaining 25% covers port operations and maintenance,” Jeane Chaezel Pontero, Head of the Economic Enterprise Development Department (EEDD) for the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal, shared.
According to her, every tourist who crosses pays a terminal fee of P150 to the province, an environmental fee of P150 (or P300 for foreign visitors) to the Municipality of Malay, and a boat ticket of P50 to CBTMPC.
A reduction in port revenue translates directly to a reduction in the province’s capacity to deliver basic services. This creates a perverse fiscal equation: an unsolicited private-public project, advanced under the banner of economic development, would actively defund the local government’s ability to perform its mandated functions.
The economic impact extends beyond the provincial ledger to the individual workers and small business owners who constitute the human infrastructure of the current system.
From Resolution No. 060, the CBTMPC, with 4,000 members, has invested nearly P368 million in the acquisition of 66 modernized sea crafts. Under a mandate from the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), operators were compelled to replace traditional wooden pump boats with fiberglass vessels, costing each boat owner up to P8 million through loans from financial institutions. For the 60 boat owners, 454 direct workers, and 2,000 dependents, the bridge will render their modernized boats obsolete.
“I’m more concerned with the boatmen because that’s their main source of livelihood,” Pontero noted. “That’s the only way for them to provide for the basic needs of their families.”
Each unit of the motorized boat averages P15,000 daily income with a gross income of P1.678 million from 2022 to 2023.
Pontero has raised the possibility of repurposing the fleet for island hopping or tour operations. But she also acknowledged that the island-hopping market in Boracay is already saturated with established operators. Adding 66 vessels to that competitive space would depress earnings across the board, offering no viable substitute for the daily, high-volume passenger crossing that currently sustains these families.
The project proponents have indicated that the bridge will generate employment during construction and operation.
However, jobs created during construction are disproportionate to the hundreds of boatmen who will lose theirs. Even the holding area proposal, which designates all commercial spaces as stalls for lease, shifts control of the spillover businesses to the concessionaire.
“How many hundreds of people do they need to man the bridge?” Atty. Quimpo asks rhetorically. The personnel required to man a toll booth can not cater to the thousands of livelihoods being displaced.
If the bridge bypasses the port entirely, who compensates for these losses?
“In terms of legal recourse, this is not something that they are expropriating an existing project of the province,” Atty. Quimpo assessed. “Because they are not taking away any provincial assets, we don’t get reimbursement for the losses to be incurred. The ports will remain standing. The boats will remain afloat. It will just result in much reduced revenue.”
BUILDING ON THE EXISTING
The local government’s position is not a rejection of development. It is a defense of an existing system that, for all its imperfections, functions.
The Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal already moves thousands of passengers daily. It generates net proceeds for health services and social programs. It sustains hundreds of boatmen and their families. The question posed by local officials is not whether the system can be improved—it can, and it is—but why the national government would introduce a parallel infrastructure designed to compete with, and ultimately cannibalize, a proven public asset.
The port’s incremental improvements exist. Complaints about traffic congestion and ticketing confusion, once common on social media, have been heard and met with concrete responses.
“Previously, arriving tourists navigated four separate counters: tourism verification, terminal fee, environmental fee, and boat ticket. Because the fees collected are remitted to three distinct bodies—the provincial government, the municipal government, and the boat cooperative—a tourist had to pass through all four stations,” Pontero explained. “The tourism verification counter, though separate from fee collection, remains imperative for compiling statistics on tourist arrivals.”
A missed counter meant a return trip and a delayed boarding. This fragmented system generated the very complaints about congestion and confusion that critics now cite in favor of the bridge.
In response, the port installed an assistance desk as mandated by the Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA) to guide confused passengers. A digital alternative also now exists through two unified ticketing platforms. The first, Boracay iPass, was launched by the Aklan provincial government on December 19, 2024. It consolidates terminal, environmental, and boat fees into a single online transaction. The second, LezzGo Boracay, was introduced in August 2025 by Topline Hi Tech and Synergy Corp. as a P150-million Unified Automated Ticketing System. Both systems generate a single QR code that allows tourists to bypass the multiple physical counters, proceeding directly to a verification kiosk and the boarding gate. LezzGo Boracay, as a privately operated platform, charges an additional convenience fee to cover the maintenance of its online infrastructure.

Yet these operational fixes represent only the first phase of a larger vision. The provincial government has long pursued the establishment of a sheltered port with an integrated transport terminal to separate passenger operations from roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) cargo traffic and accommodate the cruise ship industry. The project has a total project cost of P2.31 billion, broken down into three major packages: P300 million for the construction of multi‑purpose facilities under the DPWH; P810 million for a sheltered port at the reclaimed area under the Department of Transportation (DOTr); and P1.2 billion for an integrated transport terminal at the reclamation area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.

According to Pontero, the 2.64-hectare reclamation area adjacent to the existing port has been designated for a new terminal dedicated solely to Boracay-bound passengers. The existing terminal, currently shared between outrigger boats and RoRo vessels, would be reconfigured exclusively for cargo operations. The plan, conceived years ago, was delayed first by the 2018 Boracay closure and then by the 2020 pandemic.
The provincial government has secured the necessary approvals, with the project anchored on a DENR‑sanctioned reclaimed area. The development aims to provide a stable and safe docking area for sea vessels, including passenger ferries and cruise ships, regardless of seasonal weather disruptions, while expanding transport terminal capacity to improve passenger flow, tourism experience, and logistical efficiency.
“This separate project is in response to the previous complaints that our current port system is too congested, fragmented, and lacks proper accommodation,” Pontero said.
Beyond passenger and cargo separation, this project advances a cruise ship port. Currently, cruise vessels anchor offshore and ferry passengers to port via tender boats. The new pier extension would allow cruise ships to dock directly, whether it is Amihan or Habagat season.

“This will be the main hub, the main port of call,” Atty. Quimpo noted. “It will boost the local economy because they will be buying provisions locally. It will also be more convenient for tourists to access Boracay. Based on the architectural engineering design, it’s really a major infrastructure, generating more revenue for the national government from accommodating the growing cruise ship industry.”
Separately, the province has already expended hundreds of millions of pesos from its own coffers on pier extensions now operational at the RoRo facility. The provincial government has already signed the necessary agreements, secured passage through the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 023-2023, and obtained the requisite authority to proceed.

This raises another question: why has the national government proceeded with the unsolicited project proposal of the bridge when an integrated transport terminal, funded in part by DPWH, DOTr, and the province, is already underway?
Atty. Quimpo observed a possible lack of coordination between agencies. The port developments fall under the DOTr through Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), while the bridge falls under the DPWH.
The focus remains on fixing what exists, not planning for its obsolescence.
This integrated transport terminal project exemplifies how development can be scaled to meet demand while ensuring the financial benefits remain within the public domain. It increases berthing capacity, modernizes passenger facilities, and improves operational efficiency. It builds upon what already works, addressing the friction points of the old system without dismantling the structure that the locality depends on.
The provincial government of Aklan frames this as a transformational solution to a recurring logistical and economic challenge: sustainable tourism infrastructure, improved public service delivery, enhanced provincial revenue, and climate‑resilient transport systems.
The bridge, by contrast, does not improve the port with the possibility of more traffic congestion. It introduces a competing system designed for corporate profit, redirecting the flow of revenue and the control of spillover commerce away from the local economic cycle and toward a private concessionaire.
AUTONOMY AT THE CROSSING
The journey to Boracay Island, at present, is a public crossing. It is managed by the provincial government, the municipal government, and a network of cooperatives and small stakeholders. It is, by any measure, efficient. It is also, by design, public.
The bridge promises to alter the physical journey from the mainland to the island. But it also threatens to alter the fundamental nature of that journey, from a public service to a private concession.
As Malay and the whole province of Aklan navigate the rising tide of development, the dispute over the Boracay Bridge is about definition. It asks whether local autonomy, enshrined in the 1991 Local Government Code, grants a community the right to refuse a project that the national government and private capital have persistently pushed to move forward.
For years, Malay has shaped development on its own terms. The port’s fragmented ticketing system was met with an assistance desk and unified digital platforms. Congestion complaints were met with a 2.64-hectare reclamation plan and a cruise ship pier. The system improves because it is accountable to the people who depend on it.
The unsolicited bridge proposal competes with this. And now, with the Notice of Award issued on March 25, 2026, the project is no longer a proposal. It is a contract.
SMHC has twenty days to submit post‑award requirements: a Works Performance Security, proof of a Special Purpose Company, audited financial statements, and firm credit commitments. Failure to comply would cancel the award and forfeit the bid security. But compliance would move the bridge one step closer to construction, even over the objections of every local government body in Aklan.
Should the bridge succeed, the province has no legal recourse for the revenue it stands to lose. The law does not require compensation for what is not taken—only for what is lost.
Yet the bridge’s path forward is complicated by a fundamental disconnect in governance. The port developments fall under DOTr and PPA. The bridge falls under DPWH. Coordination between these agencies, by all available evidence, has been absent.
The tide of development is rising. Whether Malay will be allowed to navigate those waters on its own terms, or whether it will be swept along by a current not of its own making, remains an open question with no clear answer in sight.
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