AGAINST THE TIDE: Boracay navigates local autonomy against monopoly access

By Gabrielli Isabelle A. Barrios

(Part 2 of Series 2)

MALAY, AKLAN — The concrete pillars of the proposed Boracay Bridge are not yet visible on the horizon. But the legal and economic architecture that would support them is already casting a long shadow over the municipality’s right to govern its own shores.

With the project having been formally rejected by every level of local government in Aklan, the first part of this investigation documented the acute tension between public revenue and private infrastructure.

But on March 30, 2026, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded the contract to San Miguel Holdings Corporation (SMHC), following an extended comparative challenge period that closed with no rival bids. The national government even went so far as to allocate over P1 billion in preparatory funds, marking the continued progression of the unsolicited project through the PPP pipeline.

Hence, in the pursuit of connectivity, the question is no longer what Malay risks losing, but on how local autonomy navigates specific legal corridors to defend its own development path—and what awaits if it cannot. This investigation examines the frameworks available to a local government resisting an unsolicited, nationally endorsed project. It weighs the parallel push for cityhood and maps the monopoly that lies at the end of the road.

While the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal builds on the existing system as a public-led development, the bridge represents how private corporations enter the picture not merely as builders, but as gatekeepers of the entire Boracay experience.

LIMITS OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

The legal architecture governing the Boracay Bridge Project is drawn from Republic Act No. 11966, the Public-Private Partnership Code of the Philippines, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). An analysis of the legal framework reveals critical questions about whether Aklan’s rejection should be binding.

Under Section 4 of the IRR, the Boracay Bridge is classified as a National PPP Project, which is one “undertaken by the national government, state universities and colleges (SUCs), and government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs).” The Project Information Memorandum and the Instructions to Comparative Proponents, both issued March 10, 2025, identify the DPWH, a national agency, as the “Grantor” and the Implementing Agency, confirming that the project will be undertaken “through the Build-Operate-Transfer contractual arrangement, a Public-Private Partnership project, under Republic Act No. 11966.”

This means that the approval of the local government unit is not a prerequisite for the national government to proceed. Under the previous legal regime, the 2012 Implementing Rules and Regulations of the old Build-Operate-Transfer Law required that unsolicited proposals affecting local development plans secure the endorsement of the concerned local government unit before national approval could proceed. That requirement has been erased.

Yet, in June 2025, Public Works Secretary Manuel Bonoan made a statement that seemed to acknowledge the primacy of local government. The DPWH, he said, was “working with the provincial government of Aklan to secure the needed approval.” He emphasized that the project “has to be authorized first by local leaders before the DPWH opens it up for comparative proposals.”

Local officials in Resolution No. 593 pointed to the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) as the binding legal standard, not just the PPP Code alone. Section 2(c) of the Code declares it the policy of the State “to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernment and people’s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.” Section 27 reinforces this mandate: “No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2(c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained.”

Resolution No. 060 dated March 12, 2026, declared that the DPWH approved and awarded the project to SMHC “in gross violation of Sections 2(c), 26, and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,” which mandate prior consultations and approval of local sanggunians for national projects. It noted the absence of consultation with the local government unit of Malay and all other affected concerned sectors, lack of information or explanation on the project’s objectives, its potential impact on the community and environment, no local participation in the planning thereof, and no endorsement from the municipal, provincial, and regional development councils.

“Last year, they conducted some forums, quote-unquote consultation,” Hon. Atty. Reynaldo M. Quimpo, Board Member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan, shared. “But it was not actually a consultation. They just presented the proposed project to the Sangguniang Bayan ng Malay, as well as the provincial government, where several sectors already expressed their opposition.”

The exclusion extended to the national level. “Even during the proposal stage, we were never asked to participate in their deliberation in the PPP Center,” Atty. Quimpo said. “There were DOF, DOTr, DPWH, NEDA, and other national agencies involved, but we were never invited. We submitted our formal letter to them stipulating the grounds why we are not keen on the project, but it was never considered during their deliberation.”

A further complication arose from a misrepresentation at the municipal level. During the deliberations of the national agencies, SMHC submitted a letter from the then-acting mayor of Malay purporting to indicate “no objection” to the project, presenting it as evidence of local consent.

“But the mayor has no authority to bind the local government unit by issuing that letter,” Atty. Quimpo clarified. “It’s only the Sangguniang Bayan that can secure such authority. That letter is without any force or effect. San Miguel used that to claim, to argue that they have approval from the local government.”

The Malay Municipal Council never granted such approval. Instead, the unanimous rejections came through a series of resolutions, furnishing copies to the Office of the President, the DPWH, and the PPP Center.

The Office of the President transmitted the resolution to the DPWH.

“The mere fact that the resolution was forwarded is one way of saying, look into this. There are really a lot of valid reasons why you need to take a second look at this proposed project,” Atty. Quimpo interpreted.

The controversy over consultation escalated after the award. DPWH Secretary Vince Dizon, who signed the Notice of Award, told reporters on April 15, 2026, that the bridge is “a critical infrastructure project that we need to be built.” He claimed that SMHC had already consulted the provincial government. “I was informed that San Miguel Corp. and the DPWH both did consultations in the past,” he said. He added that SMHC must address all grievances and that he was “assured by Ramon Ang himself that those concerns will be addressed properly.”

Even after the contract was awarded to SMHC, the provincial board, on April 15, 2026, continued to stand its ground by approving a resolution strongly denouncing the DPWH’s action and requesting the PPP Center to furnish all documents on the proposal, bidding, and negotiations. Board Member Bob Augusto Legaspi explained that “one of the bases of possible opposition to this project would be the discrepancies in the proposal, bidding, and award process of the project.” The Aklan chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has expressed interest in assisting the provincial board on legal matters.

The legal weight of the local resolutions, Atty. Quimpo acknowledged, is expressive rather than compulsory. “When you talk of legal compulsion, it will not compel the national government to disapprove. But it’s an expression of our sentiment. Based on our system of government, the Local Government Code, there should be consultation with affected stakeholders. They should, at the very least, listen.”

The bridge, he emphasized, is an unsolicited proposal. It was not initiated by the national government. It is not among the priority programs listed in the Public Investment Program. The Project Information Memorandum itself traces the proposal’s origin to a submission by San Miguel Holdings Corporation on February 14, 2018. The government did not seek this project; a private corporation did.

“The interest of the private corporation proponent is purely profit-oriented. Unlike the integrated transport terminal project, which is more focused on social and economic development. The national government cannot just impose its will on everything, depriving the local government of its capacity to deliver services to its constituents, and favoring a private corporation,” he added.

The question confronting the national government, therefore, is whether it should exercise its legal authority to advance a project that is not a national priority, at the expense of a public revenue stream that funds provincial hospitals and sustains thousands of livelihoods. A project initiated by the national government to address a public need carries a different political and moral weight than a private proposal seeking government approval to generate corporate revenue.

Will the national government weigh what Malay stands to lose against what a private company stands to gain?

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISCONTINUATION

The classification of the Boracay Bridge as a National PPP Project grants the DPWH, as the Implementing Agency, the procedural authority to advance the project without securing the prior approval of the local government unit. The DPWH opened the comparative challenge, evaluated proposals, and issued a Notice of Award without Malay’s consent.

But the same classification also contains a critical limitation. The bridge is an unsolicited proposal and not a public works project funded by congressional appropriations. It is a private venture, proposed by SMHC, to be built and operated by a private concessionaire under a Build-Operate-Transfer arrangement.

And a private concessionaire, unlike a national government agency, cannot bypass local jurisdiction. “The project still falls within the territorial and administrative jurisdiction of the Local Government Unit of Malay. The national government has nothing to do with this. We have all the exclusive authority in the issuance of the necessary permits,” Atty. Quimpo explained.

These permits, building permits, mayor’s permits, and business permits are mandatory under the Local Government Code. They fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipality where the construction will take place.

“And since the Municipality of Malay, through the Sangguniang Bayan, already passed resolutions strongly objecting to the Boracay Bridge, it follows that they will not issue any permits for the construction,” Atty. Quimpo stated. “It’s a legal and real obstacle for the proponent.”

The Sangguniang Bayan has already signaled its intent through the removal of the bridge from the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Annual Investment Plan—a formal declaration that the project does not align with local development priorities. A local government that has formally opposed a project at every level of governance is unlikely to issue the very permits that would allow it to proceed.

Even if those permits were somehow secured, the concessionaire would face a second barrier embedded in the PPP Code itself. Under Section 22 of the IRR, any project that interfaces with an existing local facility must formalize a Memorandum of Agreement with “other concerned entities” to address operational conflicts.

The Caticlan Jetty Port is such a facility. The LGU, as the regulator of the port and the enforcer of the “One Entry–One Exit” ordinance, is such an entity. And yet, has SMHC secured such an agreement? Does any MOA exist, or has any formal negotiation toward one even been initiated? These questions remain unanswered.

The IRR does not suspend the police power of local governments under the Local Government Code of 1991. As Atty. Quimpo emphasized, a provincial ordinance “is binding upon all, even from people outside of Aklan.” The national government cannot compel Malay to amend its land use plan or waive the traffic restrictions that define Boracay’s carrying capacity. And Malay, through its elected officials, has made its position unequivocally clear.

Yet while Malay appears positioned to block the bridge through its local powers, another vulnerability lies not in what the province can withhold, but in what the national government appears poised to give.

Section 50 of the IRR explicitly states that an unsolicited proposal “shall not contain” certain government undertakings, including the “Payment of ROW-related costs” and the “Contribution of assets, properties, and/or rights.” The Project Information Memorandum reinforces this on page 4, listing among the responsibilities of the DPWH that “all related expenditures [for ROW acquisition] shall be shouldered by the Concessionaire”—meaning San Miguel Holdings Corporation.

Yet on January 31, 2026, the Department of Budget and Management approved P1 billion for the DPWH under the Public-Private Partnership Support Fund. The allocation explicitly covers “costs such as right-of-way acquisition and other government-guaranteed expenses” for a list of projects that includes the Boracay Bridge.

When asked whether this allocation constitutes a violation of the PPP Code, Atty. Quimpo offered a measured but pointed response. “I am not very familiar with the specific budget for road right-of-way. But if the Boracay Bridge is included in that P1 billion, it could be an issue. Since it’s unsolicited, it is supposed to be solely funded by the private proponent. They are not supposed to extend any government assistance under the PPP Code. That is an issue that they would have to consider.”

In addition, a separate procedural gap concerns the project’s approval threshold. The bridge project, with a total Project Cost of P7.78 billion according to the Project Information Memorandum, falls below the P15 billion threshold that would automatically trigger review by the Investment Coordination Committee under Section 24.4 of the IRR. The same section also requires ICC approval if a project “physically overlaps with a project approved by a government authority or with a project being developed by another government entity.”

Two such overlaps exist, and neither has been publicly addressed. First, the ongoing construction of the P2.31-billion Integrated Transport Terminal at the DENR-sanctioned reclamation area in Caticlan, a project funded through the DPWH, DOTr, and the local government. Second, on page 22 of the Project Information Memorandum, under “Height Restrictions,” the document states: “Partially, the project site falls into the flight safety zone of the nearby Caticlan Airport.”

The airport itself is undergoing a separate P2.5-billion expansion, also implemented by SMHC. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. led the groundbreaking for this expansion on July 14, 2025.

The same corporation operates the airport. The same corporation proposes the bridge. Yet as far as the public came to know, no ICC approval was announced.

CITYHOOD VARIABLE

While Malay might exercise its local power, and the financing contradiction remains unresolved, another process unfolds in Congress. Its timeline, placed alongside the bridge’s own chronology, invites speculation about whether the two are strategically linked.

The pursuit of cityhood for Malay is not new. Resolutions were passed in 2010 and 2014. Both stalled. Then, on February 14, 2018, SMHC submitted its unsolicited proposal for the Boracay Bridge. The DPWH acknowledged receipt on March 5, 2018, and declared the proposal complete on January 29, 2019.

That same year, then acting and incumbent Mayor Frolibar Bautista created a technical working group to study cityhood. In 2021, former Aklan Second District Rep. Teodorico “Ted” Haresco Jr. filed a bill to formalize the proposal of Malay officials but it remained pending through both the 18th and 19th Congress. On May 5, 2021, the DPWH issued SMHC its Original Proponent Status for the bridge.

The current iteration of the cityhood bill, House Bill No. 4415, was filed by Aklan Second District Rep. Florencio Miraflores—father of Gov. Jose Enrique Miraflores, the bridge’s most vocal opponent. It notes that Malay meets all requirements under Republic Act No. 11683 as a component city of Aklan. A public consultation was held on October 6, 2025. By November 25, 2025, the bill reached the House plenary. On February 11, 2026, it was consolidated into House Bill No. 07732, the “Charter of the City of Malay Boracay.”

The parallel timelines are striking. The cityhood effort, dormant for years, regained momentum just as the bridge proposal moved through the early stages of approval.

The coincidence raises an obvious question: Is cityhood a strategic move to fortify local resistance against the bridge?

“Not really,” Atty. Quimpo offered a direct answer. “The filing of that bill—these are refiled bills. But it’s not one of the factors to be considered why they filed the cityhood bill. They filed that because Malay is now qualified in terms of income, population, and land area.”

Atty. Quimpo further clarified the limits of what cityhood would actually change. Cityhood would increase Malay’s share of the National Tax Allotment. But that increase is modest compared to the risk of what they will lose. “It will not measure up to the revenues that we’re currently generating out of our jetty port operations,” he explained. “What will be lost is much greater. What they’ll return by way of the National Tax Allotment is very small.”

The jurisdiction of a city government over permits and local development remains unchanged. Cityhood does not grant Malay new powers to veto national projects. It does not expand its permit-issuing authority beyond what it already holds as a municipality. The legal frameworks for discontinuation exist regardless of whether Malay is a municipality or a city.

“But it will not affect the current Boracay Bridge proposal,” Atty. Quimpo concluded.

If cityhood is not a weapon against the bridge, it nonetheless illuminates the broader context in which the bridge is being pursued. It is a recognition of Malay’s demonstrated capacity for self-governance built through years of incremental, locally driven development.

Yet it is precisely this success that has attracted the attention of conglomerates seeking to control the island’s access points. The interest of SMHC in the bridge and in the Caticlan Airport expansion is a logical, profit-driven response to the undeniable economic momentum that Malay has built for itself. When a municipality demonstrates it can generate significant, predictable revenue, the gates to its economy become valuable real estate.

The bridge proposal must be understood within this context: a private corporation has seen what Malay has built, and it wants a share. Whether the national government will protect what the locality has achieved, or allow it to be dominated by a private concessionaire, remains to be answered.

MONOPOLY ON THE HORIZON

That share comes into sharper focus when the access points are mapped. Should the legal obstacles fail to halt the project, the result would be the consolidation of a single corporate grip over the access to Boracay Island.

Currently, access to Boracay is bifurcated. Tourists fly into the Godofredo P. Ramos Airport in Caticlan—an asset operated by San Miguel Holdings Corporation through its subsidiary Trans Aire Development Holdings Corp. under a concession agreement with the Department of Transportation—and then transfer to the Caticlan Jetty Port, which is owned and operated by the Provincial Government of Aklan. This separation ensures a measure of competition and, critically, preserves the public capture of terminal fees and related revenue.

The bridge eliminates the second step, delivering vertical integration to the private entity that already controls the airport.

“The Caticlan Airport is owned by the national government through CAAP (Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines) but operated by San Miguel under concession,” Atty. Quimpo noted. “The local government had no say in that arrangement either. The bridge would be privately owned and operated by the same corporate entity under a Build-Operate-Transfer arrangement.”

Despite their separate ownership structures, the projects are not truly distinct. One corporation would still run the airport, the bridge that links it to the island, and the land transport from terminal to crossing. The consolidation of airport and bridge under a single corporate umbrella raises questions about competition, pricing, and the local economy.

“Once the bridge is built, they will have their own buses transporting passengers from the airport directly to the bridge, ultimately affecting jetty port collection by at least 90%,” Atty. Quimpo said. “So even though the port still stands, the businesses will all be monopolized by the private corporation.”

The Project Information Memorandum, on page 17, describes the facility hub on Panay Island as having “commercial spaces for lease and parking areas.” Page 30 of the memorandum further details “Commercial Revenues” generated from “advertising in, on, and around the Site,” “lease of space inside the facility hub,” and “parking space.”

Diverted traffic, replaced terminal fees, and absorbed vendor stalls together reroute the port’s passenger base and its revenue stream from public hands to private ledgers.

“The national government has been encouraging local governments to generate their own source of revenue,” SP Atty. Quimpo observed. “Port fee collection is one mode of generating local revenues. Now, here comes the national government taking that away from the local governments and giving it to a private corporation.”

THE TIDE UNTURNED

Taken together, the two parts of this investigation reveal a development not of concrete and steel, but of competing realities. In one, the bridge is a monument to progress—a ribbon of connectivity promised by the national government and a private conglomerate to unclog a strained corridor. In the other, it is an act of economic cannibalism—an unsolicited intrusion poised to siphon over P600 million annually and render the livelihoods of 2,200 dependents obsolete.

The legal architecture is as clear as it is unsettling. The national government, operating under the PPP Code, does not need Malay’s permission to award the contract; the P1 billion allocated for right-of-way acquisition appears to contradict the very rules of unsolicited financing that govern the project; and the overlapping jurisdictions of the DPWH and DOTr have allowed a monopoly on access to advance without a unified public voice in the room. Yet the municipality is not without its own fortifications. It holds the permits. It holds the land use plan. It holds the Local Government Code. And it holds the clear, unanimous rejection of its people—a weight the PPP Code and its IRR may not be compelled to obey, but which it cannot fully ignore.

The tide of development in Boracay has never been static. For years, the province built a system of boats, ports, and fees that was messy but theirs. They fixed the queues. They are building the integrated transport terminal. They are proving that public enterprise can meet private demand without surrendering the gate.

But a bridge built in defiance of that local will would not merely shorten a 1.2-kilometer crossing. It would sever the link between local effort and local reward. It would replace a public journey with a private toll.

The concrete pillars are not yet on the horizon. But the tide has already turned. The community that made Boracay worth crossing will either navigate these rising tides or watch itself be swept away by the current of corporate interest, not from its own waters.

# # #

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